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Abstract
We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several
groups Xj of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a
team with exacly one member xj from every group. There is a cost (or
reward) for participation: if type xj chooses task z, he receives pj (z);
utilities are quasi-linear. One seeks an equilibrium price, that is, a
price system that distributes all the agents into distinct teams. We
prove existence of equilibria and fully characterize them as solutions
to some convex optimization problems. The main mathematical tools
are convex duality and mass transportation theory. Uniqueness and
purity of equilibria are discussed. We will also give an alternative
linear-programming formulation as in the recent work of Chiappori,
McCann and Nesheim [2].
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11 Introduction
Consider a population divided into several equal groups Xj, 0  j  N.
We have to divide the total population X = [Xj into teams, each team
comprising exactly one member of each group. For N = 1 this is the classical
marriage problem: there is a group of men and a group of women, and they
have to be paired one-to-one. As in the marriage problem, the matching will
have to maximize some overall criterion for tness.
This will be done by letting each individual pick a point z in a set Z,
independently of the others: more precisely, a set of prices (or costs) pj (z);
0  j  N, will be assigned to each z, and individuals in the category Xj will
pick their z by maximizing a quasi-linear utility. Individuals which choose
the same z will be put in the same team.
The functions pj (z) will be found as the solutions of an optimization
problem, so our result can be seen as giving a decentralized procedure for
solving the matching problem. Alternatively, it can be seen as showing the
existence of equilibrium prices in competitive markets where trading is not a
two-sided interaction between buyer and seller, but requires the intervention
of several types of agents. To build a new house, for instance, one has to
hire (and pay) a wide variety of professionals (the architect) and tradesmen
(the plumber, the mason), all of whom come in independently of the others
and require market prices. Buying an existing house is not so simple a deal
either: typically the buyer will have to borrow part of the money, so that the
bank comes in as a third party into the deal. This approach was initiated
in [3] for the case N = 1 (the marriage problem), although the method used
did not lend itself to such an extension.
The purpose of this paper is to generalize the results of [3] to the case
N  2 by means of convex duality arguments. Recently and independently,
Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim in [2] formulated the matching problem as
a linear programming problem and noticed that their approach also covers
the multiple agents case. In section 6, following a suggestion of Robert J.
McCann, we will give a linear formulation of the problem as in [2].
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model;
and in section 3 matching equilibria are dened. In section 4, we introduce
two optimization problems which are naturally related to the matching prob-
lem. In section 5, we use convex duality to prove existence of equilibria and
we give a variational characterization. An alternative formulation via linear
programming is given in section 6. Uniqueness and purity of equilibria are
discussed in section 7. Finally, in section 8, we extend our results to the case
where a team does not necessarily consist of a nite number of agents but is
given by a general measured space.
22 The model
We consider a market where there is single, indivisible good which comes in
dierent qualities z 2 Z. In the sequel, we will refer to Z as the quality space.
2.1 Buyers/Consumers
Each consumer buys one unit of the good. Consumer are heterogeneous: each
of them is characterized by the value of some parameter x0 2 X0, henceforth
referred to as her type. Utilities are assumed to be quasi-linear with respect
to prices: a consumer of type x0 buying one unit of quality z and paying p0
derives the utility:
u0(x0;z)   p0:
Consumers' types are assumed to be distributed in the population according
to some probability 0 on some -algebra of X0. We normalize the size of
the population of consumers to 1.
2.2 Producers
There are N categories of producers denoted by i = 1;:::;N. The production
requires specialized labor from every category of producers. Specically, to
produce one unit of good (whatever its quality), one must assemble a team
of one representative from each category, and each producer can participate
in the production of one unit only.
Each category of producers is heterogeneous. In category i, each producer
is characterized her type xi 2 Xi (skill parameters say) and a cost function
ci : Xi  Z ! R. The population Xi size is assumed to be 1, and types are
assumed to be distributed in the population according to some probability
i on some -algebra of Xi.
2.3 Teams and nonlinear transfers
For a good of a given quality to be traded, it is necessary in our model
to gather a team consisting exactly of one consumer, corresponding to the
additional category j = 0, and one producer of each category j = 1;:::;N.
Note that this is consistent with our assumption that all the populations
have the same size.
Given a tari z 2 Z ! p0(z) 2 R, consumers of type x0 2 X0 purchase




3Similarly, given a wage pattern z 2 Z ! wi(z) 2 R for category i = 1;:::;N,
type xi producers oer qualities z which minimize net cost:
inf
z2Z
fci(xi;z)   wi(z)g: (1)
It will be convenient in the sequel not to distinguish between the con-
sumers' category (j = 0) and the producers' categories ( j = 1;:::;N) and to
formulate everything in terms of costs and transfers. For notational conve-
niency, we therefore set
c0 :=  u0
and for for j = 0;:::;N we dene the transfer functions 'j by:
'0(z) =  p0(z); 'i(z) = wi(z);1  i  N




j (xj) := inf
z2Z
fcj(xj;z)   'j(z))g: (2)
which is the indirect utility which type xj derives from the transfer 'j. In the
sequel, we shall refer to '
cj
j as the cj-transform of the transfer function 'j.
Note that for every (xj;z) 2 XjZ, one has the so-called Young's inequality
'
cj
j (xj) + 'j(z)  cj(xj;z): (3)
Let us also remark that, given the transfers 'j for category j, the demand set
Dj (xj) for agents of type xj, that is, the set of optimal qualities in problem
(2), is dened by:
Dj (xj) :=

z 2 Z j '
cj
j (xj) + 'j(z) = cj(xj;z)
	
: (4)
Each team is assumed to be self-nanced. In other words, in a team that
produces z, the price paid by the consumer, p0(z), is the sum of the wages
paid to the producers, wi(z) for i = 1;:::;N. Equivalently, the transfers
satisfy the balance condition
N X
j=0
'j(z) = 0; 8z 2 Z: (5)
Since we are dealing with a quality good, note that, even if the quality
space has a linear structure, the transfers are inherently nonlinear.
42.4 Data and assumptions
To sum up, the data of the model are the type spaces of each category
X0;X1;::::;XN, the probability distributions of types 0;:::;N, and the cost
functions c0;::::;cN (recall that c0 =  u0). Throughout the paper, we will
assume the following:
 Xj is a compact metric space equipped with its Borel -algebra for
j = 0;::::;N,
 Z is a compact metric space
 j is a Borel probability measure on Xj for j = 0;::::;N,
 cj 2 C0(Xj  Z;R) for j = 0;::::;N.
We shall denote by (Xj) the set of probabilities on Xj, so that j 2
(Xj). For probabilities on product spaces, j 2 (Xj  Z), we denote by
Xjj 2 (Xj) and Zj 2 (Z) respectively the rst and second marginal
of the joint probability j. In other words, for every f 2 C0(Xj;R) and
g 2 C0(Z;R) one has:
Z
XjZ








3.1 Couplings and product lines
Of course, there is not reason why the demand set Dj (xj) should be a single-
ton, that is, that the optimization problem (2) should have a unique solution.
We will therefore allow agents of type xj to randomize their choices between
the several optimal solutions. Alternatively, we can consider that not all
agent of type xj pick the same optimal quality, so that there is for each
element of Dj (xj) a certain proportion of agents which choose it
We will dene a coupling j between the type space Xj and the quality
space Z as any probability measure on the graph of Dj  Xj  Z which




j (xj) + 'j(z) = cj(xj;z) j-a.s on Xj  Z
For every Borel subsets Aj  Xj and B  Z, we interpet j(Aj  B)
as the probability that an agent of category j has her type in Aj and an
5optimal quality in B. At equilibrium, the distribution of the demand for the
quality good and the distribution of the supply for the quality good for each
category should coincide, which means that
Zj = 
for some  2 (Z) which is independent of the category j. The probability




 2 (Xj  Z) j Xj = j; Z = 
	
:
so that the equilibrium condition on the good market means that there is a
product line  such that
j 2 (j;); j = 0;:::;N:
3.2 Denition of matching equilibria
An equilibrium consists of (quality dependent) transfers, (quality and type
dependent) couplings and a probabilty measure on the quality space (the
product line) such that:
 for each quality, the balance condition (5) is satised,
 consumers of each type choose maximizing utility qualities,
 producers of each category and each type choose minimizing cost qual-
ities,
 there is equilibrium on the market for the good: the demand probability
distribution equals the supply probability distribution for each category
of producer's.
This gives the following precise denition
Denition 1 A matching equilibrium consists of a family of transfers 'j 2
C0(Z;R), a family of probabilities j 2 (Xj  Z), j = 0;::::;N and a
quality line  2 (Z) such that:




2. j 2 (j;) for every j = 0;::::;N,
3. for every j = 0;:::;N, one has:
'
cj
j (xj) + 'j(z) = cj(xj;z) j-a.s on Xj  Z
64 Two related optimization problems
The aim of this section is to prove that matching equilibria are solutions
of a certain optimization problem. To achieve this goal, we rst need some
basic results from optimal transportation theory that are recalled in the next
paragraph. Indeed, the Monge-Kantorovich duality is of particular interest
in our equilibrium context since the last two conditions in the denition of
an equilibrium exactly are the extremality conditions for this duality.
4.1 Mass transportation and Kantorovich Duality
Given two compact metric spaces X and Z, probability measures  2 (X),
 2 (Z), and a cost function c 2 C0(X  Z;R), the Monge-Kantorovich
optimal tranportation problem consists in nding a transport plan  with
least cost:
(M;) Wc(;) := inf
Z
XZ
c(x;z)d(x;z) :  2 (;)

Here (;) denotes the set of probability measures on X  Z having 
and  as marginals. If  2 (;) solves (M;), it is called an optimal trans-
portation plan between  and  for the cost c. Slightly abusing notations,
we shall say that  solves Wc(;).













where by denition 'c is the "c-concave transform" of '. I it is dened for




fc(x;z)   '(z)g: (6)
It is immediate to check that if ' is bounded on Z, then 'c 2 C0(X;R).The
main results from optimal transportation theory (we refer to [5] and [6] for
proofs) that we shall need are summarized in the following:
Theorem 1 Assume  2 (X),  2 (Z), and c 2 C0(X  Z;R). Then:
1. the supremum in (D;) is attained by some ' 2 C0(Z;R), the inmum
in (M;) is attained by some  2 (;),
2. the duality relation Wc(;) = inf(M;) = sup( D;) holds,
73. ' solves (D;) and  solves (M;) if and only if:
'
c(x) = c(x;z)   '(z) -a.e on X  Z
In the Monge-Kantorovich problem, note that we allow to split the mass
at x 2 X to dierent destinations z 2 Z. Indeed, we can write a coupling  2
(;) as  = x
 where x is the conditional probability of the destination
z given the source x. One may therefore view the Monge-Kantorovich as a
stochastic problem where one source x can be sent to several destinations
z according to a conditional probability x. If one does not allow such a
splitting of mass and imposes instead that x is sent to a single destination
z = (x) (in other words if one imposes that x is the Dirac mass at (x)
or that  is supported by the graph of some function : X ! Z) then one
obtains the so-called Monge problem. The requirement that the probability
distribution  is a prescribed target may be expressed by
] = 




for every Borel subset B of Z. A Borel  : X ! Z such that ] =  is




c(x;(x))d(x) : ] = 

: (7)
Let us remark that transport maps between  and  may not exist; for
instance, this is the case if  is a Dirac mass whereas  is not. Even when
there exist transport maps, there may not exist an optimal one. In fact,
the Monge problem is much more complicated than the (linear) Monge-
Kantorovich problem and in general it does not admit solutions unless further
assumptions are imposed on the data, especially on the cost function. More
precisely, let us assume the following:
 X = 
, with 
 an open bounded subset of Rd,
  2 (X) is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue mea-
sure, such that (@
) = 0,
 the cost function c is continuous and Lipschitz "in x uniformly in z" (i.e.
there exists a constant C such that jc(x1;z)   c(x2;z)j  Ckx1   x2k,
8(x1;x2;z) 2 X2  Z),
8 c(:;z) is dierentiable on 
 for every z 2 Z and satises the Generalized
Spence-Mirrlees condition:
if (x;z1;z2) 2 X  Z2 satisfy rxc(x;z1) = rxc(x;z2) then z1 = z2:
(8)
Theorem 2 Under the conditions above, the Monge-Kantorovich problem
(M;) admits a unique solution  which is of the form  = (id;)] where
 is the unique (up to -a.e. equivalence) solution of the Monge problem (7).
In other words, under the Spence-Mirrlees assumption (and the other
regularity assumptions listed above), optimal transportation plans are unique
and in fact given by an optimal transport map. We refer to [1] for a proof of
this result. This will be useful when we will discuss uniqueness and purity of
equilibria in section 7.
Finally, let us note a duality result, which is much in the spirit of what is
to come. Denote by (Z) the space of Radon measures on Z, which is the






Corollary 1 F is a convex continuous function on C0(Z;R). The Fenchel




Wc(;) if  2 (Z)
+1 otherwise.
As an immediate consequence, the function  7 ! Wc(;) is convex and
weakly  l.s.c.. The proof is given in the Appendix.
4.2 Optimization properties of equilibria
Let us assume that ('j;j;) is a matching equilibrium. It then follows from
the last two conditions in the denition of an equilibrium and from Theorem
1 that each coupling j solves (Mj;), and that 'j solves its dual (Dj;).
























9Now let  j 2 C0(Z;R) be another balanced family of transfers:
N X
j=0
 j(z) = 0; 8z 2 Z: (11)





































Take some  2 (Z). With the Monge-Kantorovich duality formula, the
































Wcj(j;) :  2 (Z)
)
:
It turns out that this is a convex problem as a consequence of Corollary 1.
To sum up, at this point, we haven't proven anything about the existence
of equilibria, but have discovered that if ('j;j;) is a matching equilibrium
then:
 the transfers 'j's solve (P),
 the quality line  solves (P),
10 for each j, j solves Wcj(j;).












j dj = max(P): (14)
It follows from (14), that if a matching equilibrium exists then (P) and
(P) both possess solutions and achieve the same value. Hence a necessary
condition for the existence of a matching equilibrium is:
max(P) = min(P
):
We shall prove in the next section that this condition is fullled and actually
sucient for the existence of a solution. Indeed, programs (P) and (P) are
in fact dual problems in the usual sense of convex analysis (as developed for
instance in Ekeland and Temam [4]).
5 Existence and characterization of equilibria
5.1 Solving (P) and (P)






j dj; j = 0;:::N:
These are convex functions, and their inf-convolution H (see [4] for in-













The inf-convolution is exact if the inmum is attained, that is, if for every
' 2 C0(Z;R) there exists '0;::::'N in C0(Z;R) such that
N X
j=0




It is well-known that H is a convex function on C0(Z;R) and that the
Legendre-Fenchel transform of H is given by:
H


























Of course, by denition sup(P) =  H(0) hence sup(P) = inf(P) provided
H(0) = H(0), that is, H is lower semi-continuous at 0 for the strong (or,
since H is convex, equivalently for the weak topology) of C0(Z;R). It is in
fact the case as stated in the next proposition, whose proof can be found in
the appendix.
Proposition 1 Let H be dened by (15), then the following holds:
1. the inmal convolution is exact











The next result states that (P) and (P) possess solutions and have the




Proof. The fact that (P) possesses solutions is easy to see. Indeed, (Z)
is weakly  compact in M(Z) and each function  ! Wcj(j;) is l.s.c. for
the weak  topology. The fact that the supremum is attained in (P) follows
from proposition 1 (with ' = 0). By proposition 1, H = H so that in
particular sup(P) =  H(0) =  H(0) = inf(P).
5.2 Existence and characterization of matching equi-
libria
Consider a family of transfers 'j 2 C0(Z;R), a family of probabilities j 2
(Xj  Z), j = 0;::::;N and a quality line  2 (Z). We want to know if
they consitute a matching equilibrium, in the line of denition 1. With the
existence and duality results of Theorem 3 at hand, we have the following
characterization:
12Theorem 4 ('j;j;) is a matching equilibrium if and only if:
 the functions 'j's solve (P),
  solves (P),
 for each j = 0;:::;N, j solves Wcj(j;).
Proof. The "only if" part has already been proven in paragraph 4.2. As-
sume now that the 'j's (P) solve, that  solves (P) and that j solves
Wcj(j;) for every j. In particular this implies that the 'j's are balanced





using the fact that the 'j's solve (P), that  solves (P), using (17), the





































j (xj) + 'j(z))dj(xj;z):
One thus deduce from Young's inequalities (3) that for every j one has
'
cj
j (xj) + 'j(z) = cj(xj;z) j-a.s. on X  Z;
which proves that ('j;j;) is a matching equilibrium.
Since existence of solutions to (P) and (P) has already been proven
in Theorem 3 and existence of optimal plans for Wcj(j;) follows from
Theorem 1, we thus immediately deduce:
Proposition 2 There exist matching equilibria.
135.3 An example
Let us illustrate the previous characterization results by a simple example.
Consider the unidimensional case where Xj = Z = [a;b] for all j = 0;:::;N









where the j's are positive constants that sum to 1 (this last condition is
of course without loss of generality). Let us further assume for simplicity
that j;the probability distribution of type xj, is absolutely continuous with
a positive density on [a;b] for every j. Let Fj be the cumulative distribution
function of the type xj. Our assumptions imply that Fj is continuous and
increasing on [a;b] with Fj(a) = 0, Fj(b) = 1, hence Fj is invertible with
an increasing inverse F
 1
j : [0;1] ! [a;b]. In this case there is a unique
monotone increasing function j such that j]0 = j (of course 0 = id)
and j is given by the explicit formula j = F
 1







]0; j := (j;)]0; and  := ]0;










We claim that ('j;j;) is an equilibrium and that it is the only one
(up to the addition of constants that sum to 0 to the 'j's) since the gen-
eralized Spence-Mirrlees condition is satised here for all the cost functions
(see section 7 for a more detailed discussion). Indeed, by construction the
family 'j's is balanced, j 2 (j;) solves Wcj(j;) (the support of j is
indeed included in the graph of a nondecreasing function and this ensures
the optimality, see [6] for details) and it easy to check that:
'








so that 'cj(xj) + 'j(z) = j(1
2z2   xjz) j-a.s., which proves that ('j;j;)
is a matching equilibrium.
146 Linear programming reformulation
In [2], Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim gave a linear programming formu-
lation of the hedonic price equilibrium problem. In this section, following a
suggestion of Robert J. McCann, we prove that equilibrium product lines,
that is, solutions  of (P), can be obtained by solving a linear programming
problem.
First dene X := X0 ::::XN and for every, x := (x0;::::;xN) 2 X, the
least cost:




cj(xj;z); z 2 Z
)
:
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that for every x = (x0;::::;xN) 2 X











where (0;:::;N) denotes the set of probability measures on X having
0;:::;N as marginals. Note that this is a linear programming problem in
the variable .
The connection between the multi-marginal Monge-Kantorovich problem
(18) and (P) is the following (the proof is given in the appendix):
Proposition 3 Under the previous assumptions, one has:
1. the inmum in (18) is attained and its value coincide with inf(P),
2. if  solves (18) then  := z] solves (P),
3. if  solves (P) then there exists a solution of (18), , such that  :=
z].
157 On purity and uniqueness of equilibria
This section is devoted to investigate when equilibria are unique, and when
they are pure.. A pure equilibrium is an equilibrium in which agents of the
same type and the same category all choose the same quality:
Denition 2 A matching equilibrium ('j;j;) is called pure if and only
if all the couplings j's are of the form j = (id;j)]j with j measurable
Xj ! Z.
Note in particular that the previous denition implies that j is a trans-
port map between j and  (i.e. j]j = ) but also (by Theorem 4) that it





cj(x;(x))dj(x) : ]j = 
)
: (19)
It thus follows from Theorem 2 that if all the probabilities j's and all
the cost functions cj's satisfy the assumptions preceding Theorem 2 and in
particular the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition, then every matching
equilibrium is in fact pure.
Now, for uniqueness:
Proposition 4 If some particular j0, j0 and cj0 satisfy the assumptions
preceding Theorem 2, then the equilibrium product line  is unique: problem
(P) has a unique solution..
Proof. Indeed assume that  and  both solve (P) and let ('0;::::;'N)
be a solution of (P). Let j and j be respectively optimal transportation
plans for Wcj(j;) and Wcj(j;). On the one hand, Theorem 4 tells us
that ('j;j;) and ('j;j;) are matching equilibria. On the other hand,
Theorem 2 and our assumptions on category j0, imply that j0 = (id;j0)]j0
and j0 = (id;tj0)]j0 for two maps j0 and tj0 which satisfy
 = j0]j0;  = tj0]j0: (20)
By the denition of equilibria, for j0-a.e. x 2 Xj0, the following holds
'
cj0
j0 (x) := inf
z2Z
fcj0(x;z)   'j0(z)g
= cj0(x;j0(x))   'j0(j0(x))
= cj0(x;tj0(x))   'j0(tj0(x)):
16Our assumptions imply that '
cj0
j0 is Lipschitz continuous on Xj0, and hence,
by Rademacher's Theorem, dierentiable j0-a.e.
If '
cj0




j0 (x) = rxcj0(x;j0(x)) = rxcj0(x;tj0(x))
with the generalized Spence-Mirrlees condition this then yields
j0 = tj0;j0-a.s.
with (20) we then have  =  which proves the uniqueness of the equilibrium
product line.
8 Extension to a general measured category
space
In this nal section, we extend our main results to the case of a general
measured category space that we denote 0 :=  [ f0g where  = 0 again
corresponds to the consumers' population and  is the space of producers'
categories. We assume that 0 is a compact metric space equipped with a
nonnegative measure m 2 (0) of the form m0 = m + 0. As before, the
quality space is denoted Z and assumed to be a compact metric space. We
also suppose that there is a unique characteristic (compact metric) space X
for both consumers and producers of each category . The category  is char-
acterized by a cost function c 2 C0(X Z;R) (with the interpretation that
c0 =  u0, the opposite of the consumers'utility function) and a distribution
of type given by a probability  2 (X). It is assumed that for a given
quality to be produced, a consumer and a team of producers of the dierent
sectors has to be formed, drawn according to the measure m. Of course, the
nite case where 0 = f0;::::;Ng and m0 =
PN
j=0 j corresponds to the case
studied in the previous sections.
We will also assume:
 ()20 is a Borel family of probability measures on X, (i.e.  ! R
X f(x)d(x) is Borel for every Borel bounded f : X ! R),
 joint continuity of the cost, i.e. (;x;z) 2 0  X  Z ! c(x;z) 2
C0(0  X  Z;R).
Before going further let us recall the denition of a Caratheodory function:
17Denition 3 Let Y a compact metric space and let (;y) 7! f(y) be a real-
valued function dened on 0  Y , (f)20 is a Carath eodory function on
0  Y if:
 for m0-almost every  2 0, f is a continuous function on Y ,
 for all y 2 Y ,  7! f(y) is measurable on 0.
We shall denote by A(0 Y ) the set of bounded Carath eodory functions on
0  Y .
It is well-known that if (f)20 2 A(0  Y ) and (p)20 is a Borel




The (unknown) transfers will be given by a family (')20 2 A(0Z).
The interpretation is again that '0(z) =  p0(z) (with p0(z) the price of the
quality good z) and '(z) is the wage paid to producers of category  2 
for producing z. The self-nancing budget constraint of the team then reads
as: Z
0
'(z)dm0() = 0;for all z 2 Z: (21)
The natural denition of an equilibrium in this context then reads as:
Denition 4 A matching equilibrium ((')20;()20;) consists of a bounded
Carath edory function (')20 2 A(0Z), a probability measure  2 (Z)
and a family ()20 of elements of (X  Z) such that:
1. For all z 2 Z: Z
0
'(z)dm0() = 0;
2.  2 (;) for m0-almost every  2 0,
3. for m0-almost every  2 0, one has:
'
c
 (x) = c(x;z)   '(z) -almost everywhere on X  Z:
To prove existence and give a characterization of equilibria, one may














E(0) := f(')20 2 A(0  Z) :
Z
0









Of course, there are measure-theoretic subtleties (like the measurability of
 ! Wc(;)) and specic diculties to generalize Proposition 1, but the
main results basically are the same as in the nite case:
Theorem 5 1. Both (P) and (P) possess solutions and
max(P) = min(P
);
2. let (')20 2 A(0  Z),  2 (Z) and ()20 be a family of ele-
ments of (X  Z), then ((')20;()20;) is a matching equilib-
rium if and only if:
(a) (')20 solves (P),
(b)  solves (P),
(c) for m0-almost every  2 0,  is an optimal transportation plan





In particular, there exists matching equilibria.




Let X and Z be two compact metric spaces. For c 2 C0(X  Z;R) and
' 2 C0(Z;R), the c-concave transform of ' is the function 'c dened on






c(x)g for all z 2 Z: (22)
19We then have the following properties (we refer to [1] or [3] for proofs):
'
cc  ' on Z, ('
cc)
c = '
c on X. (23)
Let us denote by d the distance on Z, and by !c the modulus of continuity
of c with respect to its second argument:
!(t) := supfjc(x;z1)   c(x;z2)j (x;z1;z2) 2 X  Z2, d(z1;z2)  tg (24)
since X  Z is compact !c(t) tends to 0 as t ! 0+. Regularity of c-concave
envelopes is guaranteed by the following:




This proves that the family f'cc; ' 2 C0(Z;R)g is uniformly equicon-
tinuous on Z. Similarly, f'c; ' 2 C0(Z;R)g is uniformly equicontinuous on
X.
8.1 Proof of Corollary 1





2k1;X  k'1   '2k1;Z, 8('1;'2) 2 (C
0(Z;R))
2: (25)
The claim of convexity immediately follows from the denition (6) which
implies that for xed x 2 X, 'c(x) is a concave function of '.












If  is not a non-negative measure, there exists '  0 such that
R
Z 'd >

















ft((Z)   (X))g + min
XZ
c = +1:
Finally, if  2 (Z), using the duality relation of Theorem 1 we get F () =
Wc(;).
20Proof of proposition 1
Let us prove rst that the inmal convolution is exact. Let ('k
0;::::;'k
N)k be
a minimizing sequence for the minimization problem (15) dening H('). For
















By construction ( k
0;:::; k
N) is admissible for H('),  k
j  'k
j and ( k
j)cj =
('k
j)cj for j = 1;:::;N, hence we have
 
k



























so that ( k
0;::::; k
N)k is also a minimizing sequence for the minimization prob-
lem (15). Since the problem (15) is invariant by adding to the 'j constants
that sum to 0, there is no loss of generality in assuming that minZ  k
j = 0
for every j = 1;:::;N. For j = 1;:::;N dening !j the modulus of continuity
of c with respect to its second argument:
!j(t) := supfjcj(xj;z1) c(xj;z2)j (xj;z1;z2) 2 Xj  Z2, d(z1;z2)  tg (27)
and using lemma 1 we then get:
0   
k
j  Mj := !j(diam(Z)) on Z, for j = 1;:::;N:
With Lemma 1, the previous bounds and (26), we deduce that the sequence
( k
j)k is bounded and uniformly equicontinuous for every j = 0;:::;N. By
Ascoli's theorem, we may therefore assume, taking subsequences if necessary,
that each  k
j converges as k ! +1 in C0(Z;R) to some 'j. By the continuity
of Fj (see corollary 1) we immediately deduce that
N X
j=0




21so the inf-convolution is exact, as announced. Moreover, let us remark that
the 'j's obtained above satisfy
0  'j  Mj; j'j(z1)   'j(z2)j  !j(d(z1;z2)); 8(z1;z2) 2 Z
2; j = 1;:::;N:
(28)
Now it remains to prove that H is l.s.c (convexity is obvious). Assume
that a sequence ('k)k converges to some ' in C0(Z;R), then one can nd
continuous functions ('k
0;:::;'k














Thanks to (28) and Ascoli's Theorem again, we may assume, up to some
subsequence, that H('k) converges to liminf H('k) and that ('k
j) converges










j) = liminf H('
k):
Proof of proposition 3
Assertion 1. The fact that the inmum is attained in (18) follows at once
from the weak- compactness of (0;:::;N) and the continuity of c. Let
 2 (Z) and j 2 (j;) for every j. The disintegration theorem allows
to write j = z
j 
 (interpret the family z
j as conditional probabilities) for
a measurable family of probabilities z
j on Xj. Now let  2 (X  Z) be










By construction, the marginal of  on Xj  Z is j and dening  as the


















Since  and the j's are arbitrary in the previous inequality and since  2
(0;:::;N), we deduce that the value of (P) is greater than that of (18).
22Assertion 2. Let  be a solution of (18) and dene  := z] and






















This proves that the value of (18) is inf(P) and that  = z] solves (P).






Let us disintegrate each j by writing j := z
j 











for all F 2 C0(X  Z). Finally denote by  the projection of  on X. By



















This proves on the one hand that  solves (18) and on the other hand that




by continuity, this also implies that the support of  is included in the graph
of z. Hence for -a.e. x 2 X, the conditional probability x is the Dirac
mass at z(x), we thus have  = (idX;z)] and, in particular  = z].
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